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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 17/05/2006 Accident number: 156 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 05/08/1997 
Where it occurred: Qala Bahadar, Ward 6, 
Kabul 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Unavoidable (?) Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: grass/grazing area 
hard 
metal scrap 
Date record created: 14/02/2004 Date  last modified: 14/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 
pressure to work quickly (?) 
request for machine to assist (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 





At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams 
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on 
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly 
"controlled" his partner. 
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made briefly 
available. The following summarises its content.  
The victim had been a deminer for two years. It was two months since his last revision course 
and 17 days since his last leave. The ground where the accident occurred was described as 
hard, grass covered and littered with tin cans.  
The investigators determined that the victim used his detector over the two meter clearance 
lane he was working. He then put on an anti-fragment jacket and a helmet to start prodding. 
During the prodding he "made mistake by inserting excessive pressure on the top of the 
mine…" 
The Team Leader said that the deminer prodded negligently. 
The Section Leader said that the deminer put on the fragmentation jacket and helmet before 
using the detector, and worked well except to wrongly assume that the reading was from one 
of the many bits of tin can in the area. He thought the use of back-hoe machines would 
prevent such accidents in future. 
The victim's partner said that the hard ground made the work difficult but that the victim 
made a mistake. He added that pressure to work hard and quickly was a factor. He thought 
that mission duration should be shorter and work time reduced. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the accident occurred because the deminer was working in a 
fragment strewn area, so presumed that the reading was a fragment. He was careless and 
prodded using excessive force. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that "all deminers must properly sweep the area, accurately 
investigate all readings and exactly mark the reading points; if any part of the minefield has a 
continuous reading, the surface must be excavated completely from one side – or a dog set 
could be asked to check the area. Section Leaders must not allow deminers to ignore safety 
procedures. They should pay more attention to deminers working in areas with continuous 
reading from detectors". 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 200 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: 350,000 Rs Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used:  Frag jacket, Helmet 
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See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
The victim's injuries were summarised as to his lips, nose, right leg, arm, shoulder and 
fractured fingers of the right hand.  
A photograph showed both hands bandaged and bloody. 
A medic's sketch showed injury to both lower legs, face, upper right arm and hand.  
The demining group reported that the victim suffered lacerations to both legs, right hand 
(index and middle fingers fractured), and superficial scrotal injuries (scrotal haematoma). 
A compensation claim was forwarded on 28th October 1997 claiming he had multiple 
lacerations to both hands and both legs, multiple fractures to right hand, and loss of hearing in 
both ears. This had resulted in deformation of his right hand, amputation of part of his right 
index finger, a left ear total hearing loss, and a partial hearing loss in his right ear. His hearing 
loss was assessed at 50% on 20th July 1997. The damage to his right hand was assessed at 
30% on 8th October 1997.  
Compensation of 350,000 Rs was forwarded on 23rd December 1997. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as "Unavoidable" because it seems that the 
deminer was working appropriately within his SOPs when the accident occurred.  
The use of a detector technique in a heavily contaminated area is highly questionable, but the 
victim did not choose the technique to use and any failing on that score was one of the 
command group. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate equipment”. 
The wearing of a frag-jacket in this accident is rare among the Afghan accidents recorded, but 
the victim's facial injuries indicate that the visor was worn raised (at least partly). The use of a 
squatting position to "excavate" was, in this instance, in line with UN MAC requirements 
because the frag-jacket was worn. 
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this 
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement 
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by 
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.  
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